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Introduction 
The 2014 Higher Education Law in Ukraine provided for greater fiscal autonomy for 
universities. That may presage further steps in that direction, though a recent dispute over 
where authority rested over the processes for the election of a rector, and, indeed, the 
extensive bureaucracy in getting approval for this journal suggest that state control is still a 
major factor. This article, then is pertinent to further decisions in the near future as the issues 
and lessons continue to be relevant. 
The article treats three issues: 
- The concept of the autonomous university, particularly in relations with the state and 
its agencies 
- The impact of factors in the wider context on internal cultures of universities and 
degrees of autonomy in action 
- The nature of leadership in different cultures. 
It draws on a number of small research projects conducted by the authors. It was stimulated 
by involvement in ELITE, a TEMPUS funded programme aiming, among other things, to 
help establish centres for leadership development in a number of Ukrainian institutions. 
We look first at governance, and changes in the way national systems of provision operate 
when national governments are examining how countries are led and regulated, and the place 
of higher education in contributing to nation building and development, when there are 
pressures to federalism contrasting with an increasingly globalised perspective where national 
boundaries have a lower profile for some universities. 
We then consider the case of the UK where, particularly in England, government has shifted 
the system through a number of phases to a marketised model (Brown and Carasso, 2013). 
These approaches can be located within the triangle developed by Burton Clark, who 
postulated the view that systems are subject to a contest for influence among the state, the 
market and what he termed the ‘academic oligarchy’. Perhaps, given the current image of 
oligarchs, a better label might be academics and their leaders. 
McNay (2013) has adapted the triangle to a quadrilateral, splitting the state into its two 
functions, identified by Clark, as policy maker and as regulator. See figure 1  
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The changing situation in Ukraine is then examined. The issue of university governance with 
focus on organizational culture of higher education institutions in Ukraine has not received 
much attention, but this country is pursuing reforms in the higher education sector. 
Traditional approaches to studying governance and decision making provide useful insights 
into why and how higher education works the way it does but here the perspective of 
institutional cultural influences supplements the traditional approaches.   
The four influential elements in Clark’s analysis penetrate institutions in different ways, 
relating to a model of organisation culture, which we use to articulate further different ways 
of ‘being’ and of leading within universities. See Figure 2. 
 
Put figures 1 and 2 near here. 
 
System shifts: Europe 
In recent years, governance of Higher Education (HE) systems on the European mainland 
have moved towards a less Napoleonic/Jacobin framework, to one, more Girondiste, that 
claims to give more delegated flexibility to institutions . In some cases, a system of 
renewable contracts has been developed. This can be seen within Ukraine, and assumes a 
negotiated agreement on strategy between partners, with the universities as an essential 
element in ‘nation building’, bringing scholarship and skills development to scientific and 
economic development, and culture and a critical world view to citizens. In New Zealand, the 
law gives universities the role of being ‘the critic and conscience of society’, which implies 
an autonomy and independence, protected under law, to make the state accountable to its 
citizens through institutions that, formally, are accountable to the state. So, a complex 
balance within these competing expectations is needed. We explore that further through 
findings of a benchmark project conducted for the European Association for Strategic 
Management of Universities (ESMU), and apply its lessons to Ukraine: ‘Reform of 
[Ukrainian] university governance has to address the need for flexibility and responsiveness 
to public demands, and at the same time to comply with state regulation’ (Osipian, 2014). 
Those two defining drivers of strategy – service needs of clients and communities and system 
imperatives for compliance – are at the heart of our argument about interpreting autonomy 
through leadership. 
If there is a shift from state control from the input stage – detailed allocation of the budget, 
what might the alternatives be? 
Scrutiny of output: audit and accountability, with metrics based on performance 
indicators and quality criteria, with regulation by agencies – on quality, student 
satisfaction, research output The issue of how independent any agencies would be 
arises. In the Netherlands the universities collectively monitor the quality of teaching 
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and research in member universities of the rectors’ conference (VSNU); in the UK 
most agencies are government funded. 
Entrepreneurialism and competition in the market, with risks of closure, or financial 
loss, and of mission drift as popular products displace those of strategic importance. 
Would government stand by and lat that happen? 
Stakeholder governance, shared among government, institutions and stakeholders. 
Elements of all these can be seen in most European countries. If government does not 
determine policy, it certainly influences it through: 
- Expectation – clarity about strategic ends and fit with national policy, leaving the 
means to be decided locally – ‘autonomously’. Expectation is often seen as instruction 
given the option of resuming stronger central control, with ‘difficult’ institutions then 
being sanctioned. 
- Information – e.g. on performance to show those ‘succeeding’ in a competitive system 
to drive up standards of achievement. 
- Exhortation/persuasion – when the expectations are not being met, universities can be 
urged down a particular path, perhaps with ‘incentives’ – usually earmarked funding – 
to encourage the recalcitrant. 
- Legislation – perhaps a last resort, but, for instance, used recently in England to give 
universities a role of surveillance of students and staff to spot early signs of ‘radical 
extremism’ by potential terrorists 
More direct controls are still maintained. A study by McNay (2010) of institutions in 7 
European countries concluded that there was ‘autonomy, but...,’marking the difference 
between rhetoric and reality. Comments from institutions surveyed included: 
Universities are academically autonomous by constitution, but there are some 
remarkable restrictions in practical working conditions [So, ministry approval was 
required for all new master’s courses, new research fields, staff appointments and 
salaries, and leasing of buildings – ownership was forbidden]. 
Under a new Act, universities are to be regarded as ‘independent institutions’ under 
the public sector administration and supervised by the minister’. [The submission 
noted that the meaning of this ‘is not entirely clear’ – how is independence reconciled 
with supervision by the minister and integration in to public administration and its 
controls and norms?] 
We have been given increased autonomy...to implement the cuts imposed by the state. 
[That involved a contract system guaranteeing longer term funding, to give ‘a secure 
basis on which to plan over a number of years’.] 
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[We have...] ample autonomy. For example, there are no limits to internal 
organization. Few universities have been able to use the greater flexibility given to 
improve decision-making capacity and to use resources in the best possible way, even 
if there are fewer constraints than in the past concerning governance. [The lack of 
internal impact is not true, in e.g. Denmark and the UK, where an executive, 
hierarchical structure was imposed by law, with the authority of the academic body 
significantly reduced]. 
There were concerns about: performance - based funding in a zero sum game of a capped 
national budget, which promoted competition rather than co-operation for efficiency: power 
disparities in negotiating contracts with state agencies, where rector solidarity to defend the 
whole system of provision was undermined by the competition implied; and over reporting 
mechanisms, which varied in rigour and equity. So, the state shifted the responsibility for 
implementing unpleasant, and sometimes impossible (because of resource constraints) 
policies to institutions, where the blame for failure then also rested. 
These findings find agreement in other studies. Shattock (2009), reporting on part of a major 
study of change across Europe, cited the Finnish case study where ‘the steering of the 
Ministry of Education has not loosened although the administrative autonomy may have 
increased’ The Rector of Tampere University was quoted: ‘steering through funding has 
tightened all along…the Ministry of Education strongly influences the universities’ actions 
through its policy’ (p47). Shattock also recorded the increase in state steering in the UK, 
paradoxically linked to steps to open universities to market forces, explored further below, 
which reduced the independence of the HE Funding Council for England (HEFCE) as an 
intermediary body. 
In a study of governance reform in Georgia and Armenia, Dobbins and Khachatryan (2015) 
showed that although there has been a strong influence of market-oriented Anglo-American 
models, and new models of co-governance between the state and university management, 
policy learning from the west has been applied selectively and tactically, with market-
oriented steering instruments being adopted only when they do not undermine the state’s 
means for political control over HE. Yet as long ago as 1990 Wasser (1990) linked shifts in 
state funding to a need for a market-oriented approach by universities to compensate. Brown 
(2011) has contributors from across Europe recording the shift to marketised systems. 
Magalhaes et al. (2013) report on changes in Portugal, where the University Autonomy Act 
was rescinded in 2007. The new legal framework reduced the pedagogical autonomy, and 
reduced collegial authority and collectivity in internal decision-making by the academic 
community, reducing the role of the senate to an advisory one to the chief executive, and 
limiting power and influence at devolved, departmental levels This was balanced by 
increased involvement and influence from external stakeholders. Similar legal impositions of 
an executive model, based on New Public Management were also introduced in the UK in 
1988, when tenure was also abolished, and 15 years later in Denmark. How the rector, vested 
with this authority, exercises leadership is considered later in this article. 
5 
 
 
System shift: the UK 
In the 1980s under Margaret Thatcher, the UK was close to King’s ‘regulatory state (King, 
2007). The mantra was ‘value for money’ and institutional leadership was concerned with 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness. Funding for higher education was reduced, though the 
then universities had the unit of resource protected by reductions in student numbers. The 
polytechnics were harder hit. In 1988, the government ‘nationalised’ the polytechnics and 
colleges, removing any involvement by local authorities that had sponsored their creation and 
development. Funding councils were established for the two sides of the ‘binary’ system, 
with roles much closer to agents of the state than the ‘buffer’ body that the University Grants 
Committee had been. In 1992, the binary system was abolished and universities, polytechnics 
and other HE Institutions were funded by the same agency, but with four different 
arrangements for the four countries of the UK. This allowed comparisons of costs within a 
single structure and a levelling down to polytechnic levels. The traditional universities lost 
autonomy; the polytechnics gained, not least by having degree awarding rights. 
The next period saw a move to Neave’s ‘evaluative’ state (Neave, 2012). With financial input 
now more selectively controlled, and some funds earmarked for bidding within certain policy 
initiatives, greater emphasis was put on output, with a quality assurance agency using 
inspection visits to assess teaching, a research assessment exercise with quality ratings by 
discipline ‘to inform funding’, and a widening range of performance indicators. Institutional 
information was published by the HE Statistical Agency, and various media outlets 
developed league tables based on their own selection of indicators. Institutional leadership 
gave a lot of attention to these tables with strategic objectives summarised as ‘rising to the 
top 10/20/50 in the league tables’. The objective related to current position and a self-
perception of what kind of university was defining the strategy, since the factors used in most 
league tables related to an elite concept, close to those universities attended by government 
ministers. So, high entry grades rather than widening access and social diversity; a large 
proportion of first class degrees, rather than ‘value added’; research in preference to teaching; 
graduate employment rates, which discriminated against those institutions taking students 
from minority ethnic groups who suffered racial discrimination in the job market. So, 
diversity, previously represented and protected through structural separation, became a 
hierarchy. ‘University’ had different connotations from ‘Polytechnic’ and the change of 
designation induced an urge to imitate an inappropriate isomorphic model, risking the 
vocational and access missions of the polytechnics which were seen as less prestigious than 
the academic role of the established universities. 
The concept of excellence which the league tables claimed to represent was  overlain on the 
previous three Es – economy, efficiency, effectiveness (McNay, 2003). A final E emerged 
during this century as the system became more marketised – enterprise, both as a skill to 
incorporate in to the curriculum to enhance employability in the economy, and as a culture to 
be encouraged among universities. The market was still controlled, though – supply, demand 
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and price – by government. Undergraduate fees were re-introduced in 1998 at £1000, tripled 
in 2004 to £3000, and tripled again in 2011 to £9000 (12000 euros). This price was set by 
government – notionally as a maximum after 2004, but one that most HEIs adopted so as not 
to be seen as ‘cheap’: cost was a proxy for quality rating. By placing limits on home/EU 
undergraduate numbers, with penalties for exceeding them, government also controlled 
supply of places until the 2015 entry cycle, and affected qualified demand for places by 
changes to the standards of school leaving examinations. It should be emphasised that HE is a 
devolved responsibility and the four governments adopted different attitudes: Scotland 
removed fees for Scots after one year and has not introduced them, so applications have 
remained more buoyant than in England; Wales and Northern Ireland have different fee 
levels, and both refused to follow the English decision on school exams. A recent minister in 
Wales imposed institutional mergers as part of a ‘rationalisation’ strategy, and Scotland has 
seen a review of governance. So, the systems of provision drift apart, but, on the market 
front, are all affected by UK government decisions on visas for applicants from outside the 
EU, who not only pay higher fees but are treated as immigrants by a xenophobic Home 
Office controlling border security. 
The coalition government approach was encapsulated in a White Paper (DBIS, 2011), which 
usually outlines policy intent as a precursor to legislation; that has not appeared as ministers 
for England make policy by decree: 
We will tackle the micro-management that has been imposed on the HE sector in 
recent years and which has held institutions back from responding to student demand. 
We must move away from a world in which the number of students allocated to each 
university is determined in Whitehall. But universities will be under pressure to 
provide better quality and lower cost. 
Foreword to the White Paper: Higher Education; Putting students at the heart of the 
system, DBIS, 2011. 
The regulatory and evaluative state continued – see the last sentence – and so did the micro-
management, at least in the short term. The first step in moving away from tight number 
controls was to reduce the ceiling set for most institutions and allocate extra core places: 800 
to Oxford and Cambridge, who did not want them, and more to others who could recruit the 
most highly qualified school leavers, and more to those setting lower fees through a ‘no frills’ 
model, usually private providers, many being ‘for profit’. But, because of the changes to 
school exams, announced retrospectively only when the results came out, there were fewer 
leavers with top grades. The designation of private providers also fell in to trouble as several 
were found to be fiddling the figures or operating at less than a high level of probity in other 
ways. International student numbers fell for the first time in decades as government failed to 
join up its policy in managing the market.  
The commitment to ‘reducing the burdens from information collection’ was followed by 
requiring more information  - ‘key information sets’ to help applicants decide on their choice 
of where to apply, and information on teaching staff qualifications and expertise. The 
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promise to ‘strip back excessive regulation on providers’ would be shown by a new 
regulatory framework on quality and standards with much greater involvement from 
consumers/students, a new quality framework for careers guidance, a strengthened watchdog 
over institutions’ access policies, notionally needed before higher fees could be charged, 
defence of the office that investigated alleged maladministration of student affairs. Given that 
costs of teaching are now covered almost entirely by student fees, with much lower 
institutional grants directly from government, the Competition and Markets Authority will 
also now be involved to ensure ‘fair trading’ with students as customers. The list could 
extend, but this is hardly rolling back the frontiers of the state. What the policies did, even 
though they were enshrined in expectations, not laws, and were more difficult to control 
when government subsidy was significantly reduced, was create a public expectation of a 
customer focused service. That, in turn, affected the internal strategies and approaches of the 
institutions and their leaders.  
In terms of the model in Figure 2, the three periods saw a clockwise shift in balance as 
predicted by McNay (1995). In the first period, the traditional universities remained as 
collegial bureaucracies; the polytechnics, with their municipal authority history were 
bureaucratic corporations – the quadrants twin with neighbours, but are often in conflict 
across the diagonal; the first term is dominant in the pairings. The second period saw a slow 
takeover of the bureaucratic functions by the senior management as the size of ‘top teams’ 
expanded. By the start of this century, corporate bureaucracy was the norm in many places, 
though collegiality was more obvious at devolved level as heads of department acted as a 
buffer/barrier to protect their academic staff. Enterprise had been rarely seen until this 
century, when it has emerged into prominence. 
Leadership in the three periods, on evidence from work by McNay, was not dominantly 
strategic, as already implied. In the first period the emphasis was on managing the budget 
bottom line, a bureaucratic approach of regulation  and control; in the second period, ‘events’ 
linked to quality assurance were managed, but serially, with little learning for similar future 
events, and little challenge to those coming, briefly, from outside, to make judgements – 
getting good scores was essential, so, for instance, students were surveyed about their 
experience before they hit exams or got the results, and were cautioned that low scores could 
have negative consequences if they were then seen to be graduating from a low rated 
university. The third period is recent, but it will be no surprise that the emphasis is on two 
things: managing brand/reputation in the market, with spend on marketing rising by 30 per 
cent in two years and staff in marketing units expanding considerably; and managing the 
‘student experience’ which has morphed in to student ‘engagement’ as a strategy. So, 
leadership, if any, has been tactical, and closer to management of what happens, rather than 
looking to a vision and direction of what should happen.   
That reflected the pressure on heads of institutions to be less leaders of an autonomous 
organisation and more local managers implementing an externally determined agenda. In the 
first period reviewed, it was implementing austerity – cutting staff and reducing other costs; 
in the second, it was responding to performance targets set by government agencies, with 
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records of achievement published annually; more recently, it has been a similar task, but with 
measures set by a range of external actors: 
Universities are now virtually run by the various measures of their performance. They 
have sacrificed the freedom to make their own choices. Instead, they have to conform 
to the direction and choices embodied in all these external measures set by others: 
politicians, the media and management ‘experts’. 
Nearly all the measurement tools that apply to higher education are designed to 
influence behaviour. And the higher the stakes – in reputation, or money or both – the 
more unreliable the results.... 
...University planning departments today do little planning, at any rate of the long-
term strategic variety. Instead they focus on manipulating the data they report – on 
employment rates, for example – because this data influences newspaper league 
tables. (Scott, 2015) 
That critique is by a professor of higher education, who has also been a newspaper editor, and 
a university rector. It underlines the permeability of the boundary in figure 2, and the erosion 
of autonomy in many institutions, with senior staff lacking confidence to assert an 
institutional identity and destiny that runs counter to the dominant discourse among a small 
group of power-holders. That discourse combines a government view of the role of 
universities, reflected in the title of the responsible ministry, which includes neither science 
nor universities, the bulk of its budget spend, and the globalisation of league tables reflecting 
the view that that domestic economic role is part of international business competitiveness. 
The league tables re-enforce the isomorphic view of universities, where research is given 
overdue weight, even though the majority of universities’ budgets relate to teaching, through 
which they contribute to a country’s economic development by supplying highly qualified 
personnel, with, we suggest, a bigger impact than that gained from spending on research. 
That is not to deny the importance of research, but to urge balance, and urge rectors and other 
leaders to be assertive about the major role of their institution and its distinctive identity and 
place in a system of provision. The ‘system’ oriented view in the corporate bureaucracy 
needs balancing by the ‘service’ view in the collegial enterprise. The leadership role of a dean 
or departmental head is often to provide a filter to protect the professional operation from the 
paperwork operation and a conduit the other way in attempts to try to inform policy from the 
intelligence gained from being close to a diversified market and to research and innovation by 
peers elsewhere. This promotes autonomy within the university, which is as desirable as 
university within the system- both produce better outputs than corporate/central bureaucracy. 
Our preferred balance of cultures would rank order Clark’s elements of the entrepreneurial 
university (Clark,   ), from the ‘stimulated academic heartland’ in the collegium which drives 
academic discovery, delivery and standards, through the ‘expanded developmental periphery’ 
in the enterprise quadrant, to innovate and reach out to the clients and communities served, to 
the ‘strengthened steering core’ to frame both those strategically. 
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System shift: Ukraine 
The modern system of Ukrainian higher education was introduced in 1991 when 
Ukraine became an independent country after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Before 1991 
Ukraine was a socialist and communist country for 75 years. 
But Ukrainian universities have a diverse historical and cultural heritage. Some track 
their history back to the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century collegiums and schools that 
trained the ecclesiastical and political elites of the Polish, Austro-Hungarian or Russian 
empires (Oleksiyenko, 2014). The first Ukrainian higher education institution was Ostrozka 
School or Ostrozkiy Greek-Slavic-Latin Collegium established in 1576.  In 1632, a collegium 
was opened in Kyiv to teach theology, Greek and Latin, as well as Old Slavonic. This 
collegium was closed in a reactionary move to counter its Westernizing influence on the 
Russian empire and reopened only in the 1990s, renamed the National University of Kyiv 
Mohyla Academy which is now among leading Ukrainian Universities. The two other 
flagship Ukrainian universities – Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (1834) and 
the National Technical University ‘Kyiv Polytechnic Institute’ (1898) were established in the 
nineteenth century and now have the highest positions in national rankings of Ukrainian 
Universities. 
During the Soviet period educational policy changed from a distributed, polycentric 
system to full state monopoly for education at all levels. The administrative-command system 
of governance introduced the model of ‘one-person-management’ in higher education: the 
appointment of the directors and deans of faculties replaced their election (Britan, 1996; 
Kremen et al, 2006). A new model of higher education funding was adopted –total budget 
financing.  (Borodin, 2013).   
The independent Ukraine inherited a well-developed system of higher education, the 
network of establishments with an appropriate material and technical base, with highly 
skilled personnel, with social infrastructure that enabled the successful resolution of the 
problems the state faced in the 1990s (Borodin et al, 2013). 
‘The collapse of the Soviet Union was an important historical event fo Ukraine, leading 
to vigorous educational and cultural developments in promoting and legitimizing 
independence, establishing new diplomatic relations, strengthening the capacity of 
democratic institutions, and developing global partnerships in support of the new state. 
Having served imperial/totalitarian regimes prior to 1991, the Ukrainian university was 
suddenly faced with the need to recalibrate its mission towards building an 
independent, modern national state’ (Oleksiyenko, 2014: 257).   
The crucial moment in the state-building was the development and implementation of 
the national Ukrainian educational policy, as in the first years of independence, higher 
education functioned according to the laws of the Ukrainian SSR. Since 1991 the key 
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concepts of the reform in education have been defined by the National Programm Osvita 
(Ukraine of the 21st century). The legal framework for the higher education was defined in 
the Law on Higher Education (Cabinet of the Ministers of Ukraine, 2002). 
According to the Law on Higher Education (2002, 2014) a higher education institution 
is headed by rector who is appointed by the Ministry of Education and Science after winning 
an election at the higher education institution. To address the major issues in the activities of 
higher education institutions, collegial advisory bodies are established – Academic Council, 
Budget and Finance Committees. The highest collegial self-governing body of higher 
education institution is the General Meeting (conference) of its members, organized at least 
once a year, at least 75% of the total number of delegated should be composed of teaching 
and research staff. Among the duties of the General Meeting is the signing of the contract 
with the authorized body (Ministry of Education and Science) on behalf of the university. 
To address the major issues of higher education activities in the higher education 
institutions are established working and advisory bodies, among the working bodies are 
Rectorate, Deanery, the admission committee; advisory bodies include academic council, 
budget and finance commission and other (Borodin et al, 2013). 
The Academic Council consists of rector’s office, deans of faculties and other members 
of the university (75%) and elected representatives (at least 10%).  The Law on Higher 
Education (2002) provided institutional autonomy to higher education institutions – 
opportunity to identify suitable forms of studies and administration; recruiting teaching and 
research staff, as well as other personnel; providing additional education services; developing 
study and research programs; publishing activities; managing joint actions and collaboration 
activities; using the institutional estate. 
 Yershova and Gordiichuk (2013) explore the emergence of autonomy as an issue in 
Ukraine, with the establishment of a Consortium of Universities for Autonomy in 2003. They 
saw a key issue as developing a ‘blended’ version of autonomy drawing on a range of ‘world-
best’ models integrated with the process of developing/retaining a national identity, rather 
than adopting a single one: ‘how much and how far are we ready to retreat from state control 
and governance in HE?’ (p473). The ‘blend’ will balance the two in their proposals: ’the 
concept and the control of the learning outcomes should definitely be in the hands of the 
Ministry’, but more curriculum autonomy may be needed because of Council of Europe 
expectations and Ukraine’s place in the European HE Area with its common expectations and 
the belief that ‘universities will not become innovative and responsive to change unless they 
are given real autonomy’ (Yershova and Gordiichuk, p473), so that there can be more 
curriculum innovation and entrepreneurial approaches. 
In 2014 after long debates, a new version of the Law on Higher Education was adopted. 
Mychailo Wynnyckyi (2014) described the evolution of the law as unique and revolutionary 
because it was written not by politicians ‘but rather was composed, debated, modified as a 
result of compromise, finalized, and then lobbied by HE professionals and students’. Not 
surprising then that it gives financial and administrative autonomy to self-governing 
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universities. A briefing for a ‘Ukraine Universities Day’ in the UK set out 7 principles on 
which Ukrainian state policy under the minister, Serhiy Kvit: 
- Promoting the sustainable development of society 
- Ensuring access (though participation is already over 70%, leading to questions about 
standards) 
- Independence from political and religious groupings 
- Integration into the EHEA 
- Preferential funding for universities active in research 
- Support for graduate transition to employment 
- HEIs as centres of independent thought’ 
(British Council, 2015) 
Financial autonomy, and entrepreneurial freedom go alongside a commitment to quality, 
which had been a major concern. The Minister linked the two in reviewing development 
since independence: ‘a fall in the quality of education, an ineffective centralized system of 
control and financing, corruption, unequal access to quality education, a drop in the 
know2ledge and skills of graduates, outdated teaching methods and isolation from new 
developments outside Ukraine’ (Kvit, 2015). Accreditation has been withdrawn from many 
HEIs on quality grounds and there are mergers of research institutes into universities, so that 
the number of HEIs is expected to drop from over 800 at the start of 2015 to under 300 by the 
end of the year, with further reductions to about 100. There are concerns that the Ministry of 
Finance may be reluctant to cede financial autonomy, but that is crucial to local decision 
making in other policy areas. This article gives some elements of a model of universities to 
promote the desired outcomes, and gives an account of one national model – also a ‘blend’ of 
central control and localized autonomy to help inform the further debate within Ukraine and 
elsewhere. 
 
Organization culture 
McNay’s work (2013) has shown that university leaders need to be boundary spanners, 
linking the external turbulence and the need for change with the internal inheritance and the 
need for identity, security, continuity. There is a need for an integrative narrative, a story in 
which staff will play active roles, and so which carries conviction by its interpretive rigour. 
The ‘story’ should capture the identity of the university, its values and the vision they provide 
to underpin the mission and strategy.  
With leadership as a boundary function, future strategy should be strongly influenced by the 
balance emerging from weighting internal factors based on institutional inheritance and 
12 
 
continuity, and external factors in the changing environment. Trust then needs generating in 
such an analysis by evident credibility in the narrative and openness in the strategy formation 
process, with staff at devolved levels – the academic heartland and development periphery in 
Clark’s (1998) labels - who also span boundaries, making an input at the development stage 
as well as in delivery. That leads to trust in staff to implement and operate within the agreed 
strategy and to self-manage – what has been labelled ‘Lean management’. That involves a 
message which strongly asserts institutional identity and ownership of the strategy as 
generated to promote the interests of the institution. It must not be seen as based on 
implementing, even imposing, an external strategy developed at a distance by system 
politicians or administrators, whose values and approaches staff may not share or even be 
sympathetic to.  
‘An organization’s culture is reflected in what is done, how it is done, and who is 
involved in doing it. It concerns decisions, actions, and communication both on an 
instrumental and a symbolic level’ (Tierney, 1988). The concept of ‘organizational 
culture emerged as a widely accepted, discussed and used instrument of analysis in the 
1980s ‘(Silver, 2010). 
There is more to organizations than formal structure. The classic elements of organizational 
design such as hierarchical structure, formalization, rationality, and specialization are 
important (Tosi, 1975), and reflect culture and condition it, but they do not fully explain 
organizational behavior. Leadership, for example, can transform an organization with a 
formal structure of rules and objectives into an institution that is a responsive, adaptive 
organism (Selznick, 1957, p.5). Pettigrew (1979) expanded upon Selznick’s study of 
organizations. He views leadership and values as one part of a concept he calls organizational 
culture. He defines organizational culture as an ‘amalgam of beliefs, ideology, language, 
ritual, and myth’ (1979, p.572). Organization is a continuing social system and elements of 
culture exert a powerful control over the behavior of those within it. Organizational culture 
induces purpose, commitment, and order; provides meaning and social cohesion; and clarifies 
and explains behavioral expectations. A strongly articulated culture tells employees what is 
expected of them and how to behave under a given set of circumstances (Deal & Kennedy, 
1982). 
 The concept of organizational culture is not new to higher education. Enderud (1977) in a 
Norwegian study of university leadership and decision-making drew on four paradigms 
which  
…see the contemporary university as a) an ‘organized anarchy’, b) a ‘political 
organization’, c) a collegiums or community’ or d) a ‘bureaucracy’. These paradigms 
directly suggest or imply that joint decisions in the university are following a) a 
‘garbage can model’ (Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972), b) a ‘political bargaining 
coalition model’ (Cyert and March, 1963), c) a ritualistic ‘persuasion’ model (March 
and Simon, 1958, and Olsen, 1970) where joint decision making is an ‘empty’ round 
table affair between peers in a collegiums, who persuade  each other into accepting 
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decision proposals made a priori at a decentralized level, or d) a simple ‘administrative 
man’ model (Simon, 1965), if not an even simpler rule-oriented model.(p17) 
Clark’s (1983) ‘triangle of coordination’ identified three pressures acting on higher education 
systems at national level. They were academic oligarchy, the market and the state. McNay 
(1999) developed a quadrilateral that separated the state bureaucracy from state as policy-
maker. In an open systems approach, those four elements penetrated across institutional 
boundaries. Within institutions, McNay (1995) developed four cultures extending Weick’s 
view of universities as ‘loosely coupled systems’ (Weick 1976). They related to the degree of 
looseness/tightness in control of policy development and control of policy implementation 
and operation, leading to four quadrants of collegium, bureaucracy, corporation and 
enterprise. See Figure 2 
McNay’s (1995) four models co-exist in most universities, but with different balances 
among them. These differences depend on a range of factors including traditions, mission, 
leadership style and external pressures.  
The key word for the collegium is ‘freedom’, institutional freedom from external 
controls, formerly by the church, now mainly by government.  According to this model, 
university management is guided by the philosophy of academic freedom and faculty 
autonomy. Internal policy formulation and implementation by university management are 
gradual, which makes the model less suitable for situations of rapid change, though its 
philosophy can facilitate a more dynamic intellectual life. If the main tasks of the university 
are teaching and research, most developments will spring from these two activities and 
decisions will be based within the structures where they are organized – mainly discipline-
based departments – within a frame of reference set by peer scholars in the international 
community. The danger of dominance by this culture is the risk of fragmentation and lack of 
direction, with individuals pursuing their own agendas without sensitivity to the needs of the 
organization as a whole.  
The bureaucracy emphasizes equity: equal treatment through due process in a 
representative, collective democracy. Regulation becomes important and this can have many 
positive objectives: consistency of treatment in policies such as equal opportunities or 
financial allocations. Universities in this model are likely to be influenced by external 
pressures, mainly from the government administrative requirements. Policy is formulated by 
committees, which become arenas for policy development or commentary and iteration with 
the executives. A good bureaucracy develops data to inform decisions, and provides support 
to academics through protecting them from external pressures, including constant demands 
for data. There are problems here, too: a concern for consistency of standards can lead to 
standardization for convenience; novel ideas cannot be judged through accumulated case law 
from established ideas; this rigidity can be compounded by the time involved in the cycle of 
decision-making. It may be a good model for maintenance in stability, but not for rapid 
change. It has an appearance of rationality, with, often, statistical bases to arguments and 
decisions, but can be contaminated by political manipulation as members protect their 
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constituencies. The majority of decisions are made according to precedent and changes are 
difficult to introduce because of allegiance to tradition. The concentration of power in an 
executive shifts the internal culture, reducing collegial elements, and making the formal 
bureaucracy as a structure/function more the servant of the executive than the support to the 
collegium’s activities. So, data risks being used to discipline rather than to develop, and 
regulations to control rather than co-ordinate across different disciplines. 
In the corporation, the executive asserts authority, with the rector as chief executive, 
increasingly called ‘president’ in the UK. The corporate model emphasises loyalty. Top 
management has executive authority over policy formulation and implementation. Its rights 
and responsibilities in this respect are clear, and university academic and administrative staff 
members are required to follow institutional decisions. This model, based on New Public 
Management, is claimed to be suitable for making rapid reforms, but power asymmetries may 
frustrate academic staff members, making them feel disenfranchised. The risk is of a gulf 
between what McNay (2013) labels the ‘paperwork’ university, where the central corporate 
bureaucracy has an ideal model that is not accepted by those in the ‘professional’ university 
struggling to keep collegiality and academic autonomy. Handy (1993) says the power model 
can only be short term, to deal with crises, but an atmosphere of constant crisis has been 
generated by government and some rectors as a device for maintaining a strong command and 
control approach. 
In the enterprise model, top management has decision-making authority for policy 
formulation. However, implementation is usually delegated to sub-organizational operating 
groups, such as project teams or departments. The purpose of this structure is to respond 
efficiently to ‘client’ needs, where clients might be students, graduate employers, research 
funders, or, in a contract-based system, the government.  Customer satisfaction and cost-
benefit are also crucial factors for policy implementation. Therefore, it is beneficial to 
delegate so that the control of policy is flexible, and pertinent changes can be made in a 
timely manner, with the ‘centre’ supporting, not directing. This ‘culture’ is not just about 
income generation, but an attitude of mind that is, as one student put it ‘open to the world and 
going out to meet it’. It is about market sensitivity, about emerging trends, about imagination 
and innovation in response to new needs. One industrial trainer saw it as delivering delight: 
Delighting customers means continually coming up with something unusual, which 
takes the customer by surprise, and which makes your [college/organisation] and its 
people stand out from the crowd 
It is about understanding and anticipating their needs, constantly seeking out problems 
and quickly solving them for the customer. 
It is about building up long term relationships, not quick fixes, and is undoubtedly the 
route to competitive advantage. 
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Customer delight is essentially personal and spontaneous, aimed at raising the self-
esteem of the person experiencing it. For that reason, it must be done in such a way that 
the recipient does not feel threatened, nor be under any sense of obligation. 
(Gilliland, 1993) 
That very much echoes the best approaches to teaching; indeed, widening access can be seen 
as an entrepreneurial activity. It would also serve well as an approach to leadership and 
management, reflecting Ramsden’s claim that two major functions of leadership relate to 
academic skills – staff development to teaching and problem solving to research. 
However, there are some dangers in this model. For instance, there is a risk of loss of 
coherent policy formulation and implementation, of strategic drift, if market-style criteria 
dominate decision-making, which externalizes agenda setting again, this time to the market. 
Furthermore, there is a risk of deterioration in the quality of education if cost-effectiveness is 
overemphasized. A major example of this model is the for-profit university.  
Our preferred balance of cultures, which all co-exist, but with different emphases over time 
and function, would rank order Clark’s elements of the entrepreneurial university (Clark, 
1998), from the ‘stimulated academic heartland’ in the collegium which drives academic 
discovery, delivery and standards, through the ‘expanded developmental periphery’ in the 
enterprise quadrant, to innovate and reach out openly to the clients and communities served, 
to the ‘strengthened steering core’ of the corporation to frame both those strategically, and 
the bureaucracy to support all three and ensure good, equitable and efficient practice. 
That implies that those at the apex of the structure lead by listening to all members of their 
community, and then set a strategic framework commanding consensus and commitment, 
which allows high autonomy to professionals to self manage and lead project groups. That is 
supported by recent research on performance management. Kallio and Kallio (2014) found 
performance management in Finnish universities ‘is based on quantitative rather than 
qualitative measures, and the current management-by-results system has a negative effect on 
motivation among experts. The motivation to engage in creative, knowledge-intensive work 
such as the work carried out at universities, is typically intrinsic’ (p574). Franco-Santos et al 
(2014) defined two approaches: 
- Stewardship approaches focus on long-term outcomes through people’s knowledge 
and values, autonomy and shared leadership within a high trust environment 
- Agency approaches focus on short-term results or outputs through greater monitoring 
and control. 
Stewardship approaches are associated with high levels of staff well-being, which is 
associated with higher research excellence, student satisfaction, student employability and 
better financial results. So, it is an obvious approach to adopt. Except that…those in 
professional, administrative and support roles find agency performance management 
mechanisms helpful, as they provide greater clarity and focus. 
16 
 
Recent surveys by McNay suggest that the corporate bureaucracy is currently strong in UK 
universities. During CPD programmes, academic staff were asked to allocate 10 points across 
the quadrants to show their perception of the balance of cultures at university and devolved 
levels. Three modern universities – former polytechnics with imposed executive governance 
models - are treated as a group. Two research intensive universities – labelled ‘traditional - 
form a second group. Table 1 summarises their perception. Note that though the figures are 
quantitative, they represent qualitative judgements. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The figures show that modern universities are low on collegiality and traditional universities 
low on enterprise. Both have more people seeing them as corporate enterprises at institutional 
level, but there is more collegial enterprise at devolved level. Work by Rumentsyeva and 
others (forthcoming) found that in one Ukrainian university, bureaucracy was still powerful, 
and there was little openness in reflecting on internal characteristics, with resistance to 
change, particularly the transformational change anticipated by the 2014 Law and by the 
Minister. There was evidence of oragnisational ‘traps’ as excuses for doing little or nothing 
because causal factors were assumed to be beyond influence – an axiom from the Soviet era. 
Other recent research by McNay, now reported here, was based on interviews with rectors 
and senior staff, present and past, in the new context of high fees and market pressures on 
English universities.  
A key recurrent theme was the leader’s role in making students and staff proud of 
their institution, and what it stands for, often building on shared adversity. But loyalty 
needs trust on both sides and that was often missing. Poor leadership results from lack 
of trust by leaders, and is characterized by low communication and visibility, poor 
judgement/s, lack of perceived fairness and ethical standards, low competence in 
people skills. Visibility/transparency in use of income from high fees can generate 
trust. 
Competition over resources erodes lateral trust and collegiality as well as being 
inefficient. Entrepreneurial initiatives need to come from the ‘small businesses’ at 
devolved level and so need trust, but two interviewees noted that the central unit to 
promote enterprise initiatives did the exact opposite because of bureaucratic 
approaches stemming from a lack of trust. ‘Tougher times require more ideas, not 
fewer, and not risk-averse leaders who see success as having nothing go wrong on 
their watch. In the new context, there will be more complaints, defensive decisions 
and low-risk strategies, more game playing and compliant bureaucracy. 
Structural distance of top leaders makes delegation essential in ‘big business’. So, 
leadership at middle levels is crucial. Academic leadership should come from active 
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academics developing new ideas and approaches, which move up the hierarchy for 
perhaps wider adoption. Visibility allows access to top management, and 
accountability. ‘Town meetings’ are fine for the formal rendering of an account, but 
visibility should also be seen at events with ‘ordinary citizens’ that are part of 
community life and promote cohesion. Celebration of staff/citizens’ achievements 
should be part of that, and build ‘trust capital’. Bureaucracy grows with poor 
leadership and opting out by staff into ‘academic absenteeism’ as they pursue their 
interests disengaged from the organization.  
Leaders need a group of critical friends who will tell truth to power, not ‘selected 
sycophants’. They need to be seen as ‘one of us’ with loyalty to the university they 
lead, not a central political power. 
Those lessons apply in most times and places. They are essential to positive leadership of 
university development in troubled and turbulent times. 
 
 
References 
1. Britan V. (1996) Pages on the history of higher education and science in Ukraine, 62 p 
2. Brown R. (ed.) Higher Education and the Market, London, Routledge 
3. Brown R. and Carasso H. (2013) Everything for Sale? The marketization of UK higher 
education. London, Routledge,SRHE?Taylor and Francis 
4. Borodin, Y., Degtyarova, I., Prokopenko, L. (2013) Financing and Deregulation in Higher 
Education System in Ukraine. In Woznicki J. (Ed.) Financing and Deregulation in Higher 
Education. Institute of Knowledge Society. Polish Rectors Foundation. 2013. pp. 49-89. 
5. British Council (2015) Higher Education in Ukraine: Briefing Paper, London British Council 
6. Cabinet of the Ministers of Ukraine (2002) Law on the Higher Education. 
7. Clark B.R. (1983) The Higher Education System: Academic Organization in  Cross-national 
Perspective, Berkeley, University of California Press 
8. Clark B.R. (1998) Creating Entrepreneurial Universities: Organizational pathways of 
transformation, Oxford, IAU Press/Pergamon 
9. Deal, T. and Kennedy, A. (1982) Corporate Cultures. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 
10. Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (2011) Higher Education: Putting students at 
the heart of the system, London, The Stationery Office 
11. Enderud H.G. (1976) Four Faces of Leadership in an Academic Organization Copenhagen, 
NYT Nordisk Verlag 
12. Franco-Santos M., Rivera P. and Bourne M. (2014) Performance Management in UK Higher 
Education Institutions, London, Leadership Foundation for Higher Education 
13. Handy C. (1993) Understanding Organisations, London. Penguin 
14. Kallio K-M. and Kallio T.J. (2014) Management-by-results and performance management in 
universities – implications for work motivation, Studies in Higher Education, 39(4): 417-424 
15. King R.(2007) The Regulatory State in an Age of Governance: soft words and big sticks, 
New York, Palgrave Macmillan 
18 
 
16. Kremen V., Nikolajenko, S. et al (2006) Higher Education in Ukraine: UNESCO-CEPES 
Monograph. Bucharest 
17. Kvit, S. (2015) Ministry of Education and Science Newsletter, August. 
18. Magalhaes A., Veiga A., Amaral A. and Sousa S. (2013) Governance of governance in higher 
education: practices and lessons drawn from the Portuguese case, Higher Education 
Quarterly, 67(3): 295-311 
19. McNay I. (1995) From the collegial academy to corporate enterprise: the changing culture of 
universities, in Schuller T (ed.) The Changing University? Buckingham, SRHE/OpenUP 
20. McNay I. (2003) The E-factors and organisation culture in British universities, in Williams 
G. (ed.) The Enterprising University: Reform, excellence and equity, Buckingham, 
SRHE/OpenUP 
21. McNay I. (2010) Governance in European HEIs: Voices from the campuses, Paper to SRHE 
annual conference, December 
22. McNay I. (2012) Leading strategic change in higher education – closing the im plementation 
gap, Leadership and Governance in Higher Education, 2012/4: 49-70 
23. Neave G. (2012) The Evaluative State, Institutional Autonomy and Re-engineeering Higher 
Education in Western Europe, Palgrave MacMillan, New York 
24. Oleksiyenko, A. (2014) Socio-economic forces and the rise of the world-class research 
university in the post-soviet higher education space: the case of Ukraine, European Journal 
of Higher Education, 4(3): 249-265. 
25. Osipian, A. (2009) Corruption and reform in higher education in Ukraine, Canadian and 
International Educational Journal 38(2): 104-122. 
26. Osipian A. (2014) Transforming University Governance in Ukraine: Collegiums, 
Bureaucracies, and Political Institutions, Higher Education Policy, 27: 65-84. 
27. Pettigrew, A. (1979) On Studying Organizational Cultures, Administrative Science Quarterly 
24 (4): 570-581. 
28. Ramsden P. (1998) Learning to Lead in Higher Education, London, Routledge 
29. Rumyantseva, N., Chapman, D.W., Shaw, M.A. (forthcoming) Ukrainian higher education 
reform through the eyes of academic staff: change, resistance and possibilities. 
30. Scott P. (2015) To universities that hath shall be given, The Guardian, 2 June 
31. Shattock, M. (ed.) (2007) Entrepreneurialism in Universities and the Knowledge Economy, 
Maidenhead, Society for Research into Higher Education and OpenUP 
32. Silver, H. (2010) Does a University have a Culture?, Studies in Higher Education, 28(2): 
157-169. 
33. Tierney, W. (1988) Organizational Culture in Higher Education: Defining the Essentials, The 
Journal of Higher Education, 59(1): 2-21 
34. Tosi, H. (1975) Theories of Organization. Chicago: St. Clair Press. 
35. Wasser H. (1990) Changes in the European University, Higher Education Quarterly, 44(2): 
110-122 
36. Weick K. (1976) Educational organisations as loosely coupled systems, Adminstrative 
Science Quarterly, 21(1) 
37. Wynnyckyi, M (2014) Thoughts from Kiev – on Higher Education. 
http://www.ukiedaily.com/thoughts-from-kyiv/2014/8/thoughts-kyiv-60-08-2014-higher-
education/ 
38. Yershova. O. and Gordiichuk, A. (2013) University autonomy in Ukraine: international 
experience and national interests, American Journal of Educational Research, 1(11) 472 - 
476 
 
19 
 
Table 1 Perceptions of organisation culture in universities- percentages to indicate 
balance across four quadrants 
    Modern Universities  Traditional universities 
    Institution Unit  Institution Unit 
Collegium    15 29   27  25 
Bureaucracy    25 22   28  26 
Corporation    32 21   26  24 
Enterpise    28 28   19  25 
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